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THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF MILITARY SERVICE
AND WAR EXCEPTION CLAUSES IN LIFE
INSURANCE POLICIES
By CALnv E. SmiTH*
Military service and war exception clauses are not normally in-
cluded in life insurance policies issued during peacetime unless they
are in connection with accidental death or disability provisions
inserted therein. Under the ordinary accident insurance policy,
the insurer does not intend to pay in the event of accidental death
due to war, hence most life insurance policies that include acci-
dental death provisions, follow the example of the ordinary acci-
dent insurance policies and exclude from coverage death due to
war or sustained while the insured is in the armed forces in time
of war. Accordingly, military service and war exception clauses
are added to such policies and either exclude coverage or provide
reduced benefits in the event the insured dies under circumstances
specified therein.
Three main types of such exceptions have been utilized in speci-
fying just what circumstances of this nature are excepted from
coverage in policies issued by various insurers. These are: (1)
military service exception clauses, e. g., "While the insured is in
military or naval service," "while engaged in military or naval
service," "while enrolled in such service"; (2) result of 'war
clauses, e. g., "resulting, directly or indirectly, wholly or partly,
from.., war or riot"; and (3) in time of war clauses, e.g., "from
having been engaged in military service in time of war," "in the
event that the insured shall engage in military or naval service in
time of war." An insurance contract may contain any combination
of these clauses.
Numerous problems have developed from the application of
these particular exceptions, a few of which are here considered.
The greater part of military service and war exception clause liti-
gation arises from the question of whether the parties intended
to exclude from coverage death caused under the particular cir-
cumstances. 1 Military service, result of war and in time of war
exception clauses will be considered in turn with this paramount
* 3rd year law student, Duke University; Franklin & Marshall, 1947-1950.
1 VAxcE, INSURANCE (3rd ed.), pp. 632-4.
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question in mind. Particular attention will be given to the issue
"in time of war" because of its current significance.
Military Service Exception Clauses-Construction
Courts have taken two different courses in interpreting provi-
sions in life insurance policies limiting or excepting liability on the
part of the insurer during the period of military service by the
insured. One line of authority holds that the intent of the parties,
as expressed in the usual military exception clause, is to terminate
the liability of the insurer whenever the status of the insured
becomes that of a member of the armed forces.2 This is commonly
known as the "status" interpretation and is usually given blanket
effect where there is no ambiguity in the terms of the insurance
contract.
Under the second line of authority, the courts have construed the
language of the military exception clause as limiting the liability of
the insurer only when death results from some cause growing out
of military service and not common to civilian life.3 This is com-
monly known as the "causal" interpretation and is followed by a
minority of authorities. These two lines of authority still persist.
Status interpretation.
A good example of the application of the "status" interpreta-
tion appears in a recent New York case, White v. New York Life
Ins. Co." In that case a policy, dated March 28th, 1944, was issued
on the life of a civilian woman. Several days later, on April 1st,
1944, this woman received a commission in the Army Nurse Corps.
She served in this capacity until her death on April 29th, 1945.
While off duty and on her way to a dance on Saipan, the insured
was murdered by three sailors. Her death was not directly attrib-
utable to military service or war. The policy was a conventional
life policy carrying a rider which set out a restricted amount pay-
2 Bending v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 182, 58 N.E.2d 71
(1944); Miller v. Illinois Banker's Life Assoc., 138 Ark. 442, 212 S.W. 310,
7 A.L.R. 378 (1919); Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177
N.W. 242 (1920).3 Boatwright v. American Life Ins. Co., 191 Iowa 253, 180 N.W. 321, 11
A.L.R 1097 (1920); Gorder v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 49 N.D. 192, 180
N.W. 514, 11 A.L.R. 1080 (1920); Myli v. American Life Ins. Co., of Des
Moines, 43 N.D. 495, 175 N.W. 631, 11 A.L.R. 1097 (1919) ; Redd v. American
Cent. Life Ins. Co., 200 Mo. App. 383, 207 S.W. 74 (Kan. City Ct. of App.
1918).
'190 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1951).
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able if the insured met death as set forth under several conditions,
ViZ.:5
"outside the home areas, while the insured is in the mili-
tary or naval service of any country engaged in war."
(Italics added)
A court construing the wording of this policy might readily
hold that since war was not the "proximate cause" of the insured's
death, the claimant should be allowed full recovery on the policy.
In support of this construction, the claimant-beneficiary showed
that the insured contracted for the insurance only four days prior
to her going on active duty; that arrangements were made for the
periodic payment of premiums; and that the insurer was notified
by letter of the insured's status, i. e., that she was in military
service and overseas. The fact that the company had been put on
notice and continued to accept premiums on the policy, it was con-
tended, indicated recognition by the company that the policy was
in full force and effect.
Notwithstanding this persuasive argument, the New York court
held for the insurer. The court pointed out that the company was
bound to keep the policy in effect on a limited coverage basis and
had the company terminated the policy, it would have been guilty
of breach of contract.
To the same effect is a fairly recent Pennsylvania cases which
disallowed recovery even though the insured was on furlough and
was killed in an automobile accident while at home. The insurance
contract provided that the policy would be suspended "while the
insured is in the military or naval service in time of war." Clearly
the death was not the result of war time military service, although
it did occur during the excepted period.
Causal interpretation.
In Barnett v. Merchant's Life Ins. Go. of Des Moines,7 the court
applied the causal approach and said in effect that the phrase "en-
gaged in military service in time of war," in order to have a con-
sistent and harmonious construction in connection with the general
terms and scope of the insurance contract, must denote such service
as would increase the hazard or risk of the insurer. Where the in-
Id. at 424.
Wolford v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 162 Pa. Super. 259, 57 A.2d
581 (1948).
187 Okla. 42, 208 Pac. 271 (1922), (insured, a marine, died of pneumonia
two days after landing in France).
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sured died at a place other than where there is military conflict,
from a disease common alike to civilian and military life, there is
no just reason to permit the insurer to escape liability for the event
insured against under its primary obligation.
In accord with the Barnett view is the opinion in Young v.
Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn.8 In this case the court noted
that the view has been taken in some cases that a provision limiting
liability of the insurer while the insured is "engaged" in military
service means death while doing or taking part in some military
activity, and that the parties intended that liability should relate
to death resulting from some act connected with the service in con-
tradistinction to a period of time when the insured was in such
service. The court thereupon held the exception would reduce in-
surer's liability only if death should result from risk peculiar to
military service and that the clause cannot reasonably refer to in-
sured's status as a soldier.
Questions arising under military service exception clauses are
of increasing importance in light of the recent war and the current
Korean hositilities. Since ambiguous terms in an insurance policy
are generally construed in favor of the insured and since juries are
likely to find against the insurer, it is of extreme importance that
insurance companies re-word their polices to express emphatically
their intention. There is no reason why these clauses could not be
plainly worded so as to adopt either the "status" or the "causal"
meaning, and thus obviate needless litigation.
In cases interpreting "military service exception" clauses as
applying solely to the cause of death and in those involving the
phrase "result of war," the question arises as to just when is death
the result of military service or of war ? It is simple to lay down
a rule which specifies that military service or war death is one that
is normally a result of military service or war and not common
to everyday life. A rule of this sort is of little help when a situa-
tion arises in which elements of both are involved. This leads to a
consideration of the second problem.
Result of War Clauses-Causation
In Grimes v. New York Life Ins. Co.,9 a civilian engineer was
killed when traveling between Army bases on his way to an assigned
post. The engineer had been furnished to the Navy by a private
corporation and was assigned to a post with the Navy. Death came
S204 S.C. 386, 29 S.E. 2d 482 (1944).
984 l .Supp. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
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to the engineer when the military plane in which he was riding
crashed into a mountain. An issue was raised as to whether the
engineer's death was a "result of war" so as to limit recovery on a
life insurance policy to paid premiums and interest. This was
held to be a jury question.
In New England Mut. Life Ins. Go. v. Gfflette, 0 the insured
was killed in an airplane crash near Lisbon, Portugal, during
World War II while traveling on an assignment for the Office of
Civilian Defense. In this case, L. Hand, J., pointed out that the
"result of war" provision cannot be considered to cover all deaths
which would not have happened had there been no war. The line
must be drawn some place between immediate death by enemy ac-
tion and death as a remote result of war, in the sense that war was
merely one of the conditions sine qua non to its happening. The
insured did not die as an immediate result of enemy action, and
it is certainly an issue of material fact whether the circumstances of
his death falls on one side or the other of the line. The court went
on to cancel the policy on other grounds.
It appears from the cases that where a court takes the causal
interpretation of war clauses, it will require the insurer to pay
only the reduced amount provided for in the policy if the in-
sured met his death in combat or otherwise from a cause clearly
related to and resulting from his service." If a question arises
as to whether the insured's death was a result of war, the question
will be a question of fact for a jury to decide.
Most phases of the two preceding questions have been discussed
by many writers,' 2 but little attention has been paid to the third
question which involves the problem of when a state of war exists
so as to make the "war clause" operative.
In Time of War-or Result of War Clauses.
When Is There a War?
The interpretation of the terms "in time of war," "result of
war" and "country engaged in war," as employed in war exception
10 171 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1948).
"'Bradshaw v. Farmers and Bankers Life Ins. Co., 107 Kan. 681, 193 Pac.
332, 11 A.L.R. 1091 (1920); accord, Nowlan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Amer., 88 W. Va. 563, 107 S.E. 177 (1921) (draftee, killed in action, is en-
gaged in military service and the restriction does not apply solely to one -who
enlists). See, also, VANCE, INsURANCE (3rd ed.), pp. 632, 637.
1 3 ARx. L. Rav. 475 (1949); 17 FoRD L. Rav. 63 (1948); 44 MorC. L.
Rav. 1150 (1946); 32 MjNx L. REv. 74 (1947); 23 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 149
(1948); 5 WASH. & LEE L. Bav. 249 (1948); 56 YALE L. J. 746 (1947);
and VANcE, INSURANOE (3rd ed.), pp. 632-640.
16 DuxE BAR JoURNAL
clauses of life insurance policies, where loss of life has occurred in
periods when factually this country has appeared to be at war but
before any formal declaration of war has been made, is a problem
which raises the question of what is meant by "war." At the
present time when fighting is going on in Korea without a formal
declaration of war and in which this country is expending more
and more lives, it becomes of vital interest to both insurance com-
panies and insureds to know just what stand courts will take on
policies carrying "war'exception" clauses.
There has always been a time lapse between the cessation of
hostilities and the formal recognition thereof. Moreover, actual
war operations have become more and more frequent before there
has been a formal declaration of war.
Probably the most pertinent case of note which involved the
particular point of whether a "war clause" limitation was opera-
tive and wherein the court had to define "war" is that of Vander-
bilt v. Travelers' Ins. Co.18 That case held that the insurance
company was not liable on a policy which expressly provided that
it did not cover death resulting directly or indirectly or wholly
or partly from war. The insured was a passenger aboard the
Lusitania, a British steamer which was sunk by a German sub-
marine while a state of war existed between Germany and Great
Britain. The insured was an American citizen. The court in
denying recovery held that "war" is every contention by force
between two nations under authority of their respective govern-
ments. It is not difficult to reconcile this decision with justice, as it
seems to reach an eminently fair result in light of the language used
in the policy.
It is no more difficult to uphold a ruling in favor of the in-
surer where the claimant was suing on a policy carrying a "war
clause" for a death caused prior to our entry into World War II
by the sinking by a German submarine of an American destroyer.14
The destroyer was shepherding a convoy which was transporting
"lend-lease" war materials to Britain and her allies. At the time
of the torpedoing the United States was theoretically a neutral
country. Notwithstanding our neutrality, which was questionable,
the court held that the sinking by submarines of ships belonging
to a belligerent nation or of ships of another nation convoying war
28112 Misc. 248, 184 N. Y. Supp. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
1' Stankus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 44 N.E.2d 687 (1942).
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materials and supplies to a belligerent nation is the usual result of
"waging war" by one nation against another. This, too, appears to
be a sound and logical view of the factual components of a "shoot-
ing war."
From the two preceding cases it would appear that the law
had taken a definite trend and insurance companies could rely on
the insulation afforded by their "war clauses." But Pearl Harbor
was attacked on December 7, 1941, and cases arising out of this
incident have shattered any complacency insurance companies may
have been enjoying prior to that date. Directly out of the attack on
Pearl Harbor five cases arose which hinged on the issue of whether
the period from the time of the attack until the following day,
December 8, 1941, when Congress formally declared war, con-
stituted a period of war so as to make "war clause" provisions
operative to limit the insurer's lability. Four of these five
cases held that "war" in its legalistic sense did not take effect
until the time when Congress made a formal declaration of war;15
the fifth held that war existed from the time of the initial Japanese
attack."'
In Pang v. Sun Life Assurance Co.17 the court pointed out that
the Japanese bombing of the U. S. S. Panay in China four years be-
fore Pearl Harbor, like the depredations of the bandit Villa with
their ensuing incidents, did not subsequently lead to war. Thereon
the court reasoned that war did not exist until Congress and the
President confirmed and stated officially on December 8 that a state
of war existed.
In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion,18 which held contra to
the Pang case, the court reasoned that when one sovereign nation
attacks another and the latter resists attack, war in the fair sense
of the word exists, and the courts are not required to wait on
formalities before recognition of the fact. A formal declaration by
Congress was not essential to determine that a state of war com-
menced with the attack on Pearl Harbor.
lu Pang v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 37 Hawaii 208 (1945) ; Savage
v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 57 F. Supp. 620 (W.D.La. 1944) (death
did not result from I war or any act incident thereto"); Rosenau v. Idaho Mut.
Ben. Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944) (not military service of any
country at war); West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S. C. 422, 25
S.E.2d 475 (1943) (not in time of war).
116 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946), cert.
denied 331 U. S. 811 (1947), rehearing denied 331 U. S. 867 (1947).
ii See note 15, mpra.
'8 See note 16, supra.
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Immediately after World War II there came an interim when
no actual full-scale war was in progress, and still there was no
formal treaty of peace. Out of this period eame a case where the
legalistic approach worked against the insured. In Stinson v.
New York Life Ins. (o.,19 the plaintiff as beneficiary of an insur-
ance policy brought suit to recover the face amount of a policy
which contained a provision limiting the liability of the insurance
company to a restricted amount if the death of the insured oc-
curred outside the "home areas" while in the military or naval
forces "of any country engaged in war." The insured, a major
in the Quartermaster Corps of the United States Army, died in-
stantly in a fall from a window of a hotel in Reims, France, on
October 2, 1945. The defendant's motion for summary judgment
was granted.
The term "engaged in war" as used in this policy, it was held,
does not connote merely the actual exercise of hostile forces be-
tween nations, but refers to the status of war or peace as de-
termined by the political branches of government. It was not until
December 31, 1946, that the President declared hostilities to be
ended, therefore the United States continued to be in a legal state
of war at the time of the accident.
The United States is now engaged in a United Nations police
action of questionable status. Cases can be expected to appear in
the near future involving the interpretation and effect of war
clauses under the existing situation. With the advent of the legal-
istic interpretation of such clauses came a significant change in the
outlook for insurance companies. This is indicated by two recent
decisions of a Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
In Harding v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co.,20 the insured
was killed in a railroad accident in route to camp for military train-
ing, and the plaintiff claimed double indemnity under a policy
which provided in part as follows :1
"Termination :-These provisions for the Accidental Death
Benefit shall immediately terminate: ...
(b) if the Insured shall at any time, voluntarily or in-
voluntarily, engage in military, air, or naval service in
time of war;. . ." (Italics added).
1- 167 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
20 171 Pa. Super. 236, 90 A.2d 589 (1952).
11iz., at 590.
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The appellate court, in allowing recovery on the double indemnity
provision, reasoned that the term "war" in the double indemnity
clause was susceptible to more than one construction. It was am-
biguous in that it failed to distinguish between declared and un-
declared war, and therefore the term should be construed in favor
of the insured.
In Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 22 decided immedi-
ately after the Harding case, the court reaffirmed its holding in the
earlier case. However, the facts were somewhat different. In the
Beley case the insured was recalled into the Army in October 1950;
he was subsequently killed in action in Korea in March 1951; the
policy included a double indemnity clause for accidental death;
the policy provided inter alia that :23
"In the event that the Insured engages in military or naval
service in time of war, the liability of the company shall
be limited to the return of the premiums paid . . . , unless
the Insured shall have previously secured from the Com-
pany a permit to engage in such service...
"Risks Not Assumed :-The company shall not be liable for
the additional Accidental Death Benefit specified above if
said death shall result by reason of any of the following:
(d) Military... service in time of war." (Italics added.)
The Superior Court in holding for the plaintiff said the claimant
could recover under the principal insuring clause and also under
the double indemnity provision notwithstanding the fact that the
insured was killed in action in Korea while in the Army. The re-
sult was reached in a state which takes the "status" view in inter-
preting "military service" exception clauses. 24  The court dis-
tinguished an earlier decision rendered by it by saying:25
"The Wolford case, [162 Pa. Super. 259, 57 A.2d 581
1948] . . .while recognized as authority for holding that
'status' and not 'character of service' is the test of termi-
nation of the double indemiity feature, is not controlling
here, for there the fact that the insured met death 'in time
of war' was not questioned. Here it is seriously ques-
tioned. In fact, the case turns on what the parties in-
tended by the word 'war'."
"171 Pa. Super. 253, 90 A.2d 597 (1952).
"Id. at 598.
24 See note 6, supra.
"r Case cited supra note 20, quoted from 90 A.2d at 591.
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Imagine the vast effect on the resources of insurance companies
whose policies carry simple "war clauses" which a decision such
as this may have if followed in sufficient numbers. At the time of
this writing there have been over 123,000 American casualties in
Korea. Of these casualties, 21,741 have been killed; 10,793 re-
main missing and unaccounted for; and a force of approximately
525,000 Americans remain engaged in hostilities. There is an ever
present possibility of the scope of the war being enlarged with little
prospect of a cessation of hostilities in the near future.
Conclusion
Military service and war exception clauses are not against pub-
lic policy. It is a widely recognized right of an insurance company
to choose and to limit the kinds of risks it is willing to assume.
As has been shown, the advent of the legalistic interpretation of
establishing the time when a "war clause" can become operative
have worked both for and against the insurer.
Today we are engaged in a United Nations policing action which
has the length, breadth and scope of a full scale war. If the few
jurisdictions which have taken the legalistic view of "war clauses"
stand. by this approach and multiply their numbers to a consider-
able extent, when more and more cases of this nature find their way
into their courts, it is inevitable that insurance companies are going
to suffer and be forced to alter their policy provisions. Insurance
companies can and will revise their actuarial tables to include the
added risks which may be forced on them in greater numbers than
heretofore anticipated.
It is submitted that the problems involved in this particular
phase of the law may well result in: (1) new provisions in life
insurance policies; (2) legislation defining war and regulating these
new provisions; (3) legislation designed to avert a severe strain
on insurance companies; and (4) an increasing number of jurisdic-
tions recognizing the Korean hostilities as an actual "war." Again
it is emphasized that, since ambiguous terms in an insurance policy
are generally construed in favor of the insured and since juries tend
to find against the insurer, it is of extreme importance that insur-
ance companies clearly express their intention in the wording of
military service and war exception clauses in the policies they issue.
